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Joseph Phillip Vardner 
 
Proposed Regulations for The Packers & Stockyard Act: 90 years in the 
making, but is the USDA ahead of itself already? 
 
Abstract: This paper takes a look at regulations proposed by the USDA last June 
pursuant to its authority under the Packers & Stockyard Act of 1921.  The 
Packers & Stockyard act was passed shortly after the FTC Act and was meant to 
aid in enforcing the antitrust laws in the meatpacking sector.  After ninety years 
without regulations, several courts of appeals recently began pushing back on 
the USDAʼs interpretation of the Act and begin requiring additional proof beyond 
what the USDA felt was necessary.  In response, and at the urging of Congress, 
the USDA proposed the rules addressed in this paper.  After their proposal, 
industry participants and Congress voiced concern that the regulations stretched 
too far.  Due to the substantial change proposed by these regulations, a complete 
review of all proposed changes is beyond the scope of this paper.  I examine 
parts of the regulations in light of other laws and antitrust policies previously 
enforced. I conclude that some of the proposed regulations are nothing more 
than agricultural versions of laws that exist in other industries while other 
regulations appear unprecedented and should be interpreted narrowly. 
 
 
“The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal 
fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind.”
1 
 
Antitrust has a naturally agrarian beginning.  Near the end of the 19
th 
century, farmers were especially concerned about the growing “grave evil” of the 
                                                        
1 Page Smith, THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE POST-
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 466 (1984) (stating the Omaha platform).   2 
“vast fortunes [developing] in single hands.”
2  Stories raged of the consolidated 
and powerful packers forcing prices down for farmers until they had to fold or be 
absorbed.
3  Concerns grew so great that Nebraska, for the first time in thirty-one 
years, voted a democrat into office to combat the trusts.
4  This concern continued 
on into the early 20
th century and received Congressional action through the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.  To show support for farmers, the Clayton Act 
proceeded to slow down merging agricultural firms yet exempted non-stock 
farmer cooperatives, theoretically allowing farmers to slightly increase their 
market power.
5  In fact, the Federal Trade Commissionʼs (FTC) first investigation 
targeted the five largest meatpacking firms in the US.
6  Farmers were impressed 
with this display of action and strength.
7  Based on the FTCʼs report, Congress 
closely examined the meatpacking industry and passed the Packers & 
Stockyards Act (PSA) of 1921, which, in part, prohibited meatpackers from 
engaging in or using any “unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or 
device in commerce.”
8  This language is eerily similar to Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, a statute believed to reach farther than any previous antitrust law. 
                                                        
2 Page Smith, The Rise of Industrial America: A People’s History of the Post-
Reconstruction Era 132 (1984) (quoting Democrat George Hoar of Mississippi). 
3 Meat-Packer Legislation, Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture, House of 
Representatives, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 2211 (1920). 
4 Page Smith, The Rise of Industrial America: A People’s History of the Post-
Reconstruction Era 465 (1984) (the democrat was William Jennings Bryan). 
5 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2010). 
6 G. Cullom Davis, The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1919, 
Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., Dec. 1962, at 441. 
7 Id. 
8 Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 181-231 (2010).   3 
However, since their passage nearly a century ago, the antitrust laws have 
not completely lived up their promise.
9  The agricultural marketplace continues to 
consolidate with market shares continuing to rise.
10  In an attempt to prevent 
some of the evils that accompany such consolidation, the USDA recently 
proposed regulations defining what constitutes violations of the PSA.
11  However, 
the timing was not due purely to the ideals of helping farmers.  After nearly ninety 
years of silence, these regulations arose due to an increasing number of courts 
placing limits on what violates the PSA.  While revolutionary already because of 
its late timing, the proposed regulations also caught attention because of their 
sweeping declaration about what constitutes ʻunfair.ʼ  Since enforcement of the 
PSA falls on both the USDA
12 and private individuals,
13 these regulations require 
careful consideration lest they swamp the agricultural industry with lawsuits. 
The PSAʼs History 
The PSA makes it unlawful for packers
14 to: 
                                                        
9 Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A new direction for Agricultural Law, 75 N. 
Dak. L. Rev. 449 (1999) (generally describing the failure of existing antitrust laws). 
10 Id. at 455.  This increase in the market share of a few only furthers the already present 
imbalance of bargaining power.  Economic indicators hint that this imbalance does not 
further consumer or market welfare.  For example, from 1984 to 1999, consumer prices 
on food rose by 3 percent while payments made to farmers decreased by 36 percent.  Id. 
at 455-56. 
11 Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 35338 (proposed June 
22, 2010) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
12 7 U.S.C. § 210 (2010). 
13 7 U.S.C. § 209 (2010) (private right of action created by Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 6, 90 
Stat. 1249, 1250 (1976)). 
14 The PSA originally applied only to the livestock and meat packing industries.  Since 
then Congress added two more industries.  Live poultry dealers were added in 1935, see 
Pub. L. No. 74-272, 49 Stat. 648 (1935), and swine contractors were added in 2002, Pub.   4 
a.  Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive 
practices or device; or 
b.  Make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to 
any particular person or locality in any respect whatsoever, or subject 
any particular person or locality to any undue or unreasonable 
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever;
15 
The dictionary definitions at the time of the actʼs passage similarly offer no 
assistance.  ʻDeceptive,ʼ ʻunfair,ʼ unjust,ʼ ʻundue,ʼ and ʻunreasonableʼ are terms as 
vague now as they were then.
16  As such, the definitions do not help determine 
the scope of sections 202(a) or (b). 
Comparing sections 202(a) and (b) to the other sections may provide 
some clarity.  The three additional restrictions that exist in section 202 notably 
include language related to “creating a monopoly” or “restraining trade,”
17 
language not present in sections (a) and (b).  Without such language, many 
questions surround what sections (a) and (b) prohibit.  Yet, despite this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
L. 107-171, S. 10502(b)(1), 116 Stat. 134, 509 (2002).  However, despite these additions, 
the PSA still remains considerably more focused than the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal 
Trade Commission Acts.  For this paper, Packers will refer to all of these groups.  The 
term ‘growers’ will also be used to refer to the various farmers these packers interact. 
15 Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64 § 202(a)-(b), 42 Stat. 159, 161 (1921) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 192(a)-(b) (2010) 
16 At the time of the PSA’s passage, “deceptive” was defined as “[t]ending to deceive; 
having power to mislead, or impress with false opinions”; “unfair” as “[n]ot fair in act or 
character; disingenuous; using or involving trick or artifice; dishonest; unjust; 
inequitable” (2d. definition); “unjust” as “[c]haracterized by injustice; contrary to justice 
and right; wrongful”; “undue” as “[n]ot right; not lawful or legal; violating legal or 
equitable rights; improper” (2d. definition); and “unreasonable” as “[n]ot conformable to 
reason; irrational” or “immoderate; exorbitant.”  Webster’s New International Dictionary 
578, 2237, 2238, 2245, 2248 (1
st ed. 1917). 
17 7 U.S.C. § 192(c)-(e) (2010).   5 
ambiguity, Congress has not sought to clarify the language despite passing 
several amendments over the decades.  To aid in understanding sections 202(a) 
and (b), it helps by beginning with some history on the origin of the PSA. 
  The livestock industryʼs structure called out for regulatory intervention 
even a century ago.  Since the beginning of the industrial age, it has contained a 
fundamental imbalance in bargaining power.  Due to factors including the high 
number of sellers and the few number of buyers, the perishability of the food, and 
a consistent reluctance of farmers to band together, this imbalance has played a 
significant role in the industryʼs development and build up to the PSAʼs 
passage.
18 
  [P]ersistent worries about the concentration problem and 
farmer bargaining power led to passage of the Clayton Act and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.  Agrarian concerns inhere 
in both statutes.  The Clayton Act specifically limits the 
concentration that alarmed farmers, and it confers an antitrust 
exemption upon farmer efforts to organize themselves 
economically.  The Federal Trade Commission Act created the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with high expectations that some 
action would be taken against the “Big Five” meatpackers.
19 
 
Despite focusing on the problem, Congress quickly realized that the nationʼs 
existing antitrust laws
20 were ineffective to adequately address these problems.
21  
Nonetheless, Congress use “[t]he resulting FTC report on the meatpacking 
                                                        
18 Michael Stumo & Douglas O’Brien, Antitrust Unfairness vs. Equitable Unfairness in 
Farmer/Meat Packer Relationships, 15 Drake J. Agric. L. 91, 92-93 (Spring 2003). 
19 Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for Agricultural Law, 75 
N.D. L. Rev. 449, 485-87 (1999). 
20 The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. 
21 Current Legislation, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 68, 69 (1922).   6 
industry [as] the rationale for Congressional efforts to scrutinize closely the 
packing industry.”
22 
One of the first cases filed by the newly created FTC was against the Big 
Five.
23  The FTC settled the case the same day it filed the complaint.  In the 
settlement, the packers agreed to a consent decree that restricted them from 
owning or controlling the livestock channels.
24  However, even the consent 
decree did not appease the politicians.
25 
Congress passed the PSA in 1921 based on the Federal Trade 
Commissionʼs six-volume report explaining how the “Big Five” packinghouses 
dominated meatpacking markets.
26  This large report and numerous 
Congressional hearings created a voluminous record containing fodder for 
selective reading and the creation of several legislative histories.
27  However, 
some statements are agreed upon by almost all.  No one denies that Congress 
passed the PSA after this countryʼs three primary antitrust laws: the Sherman, 
                                                        
22 Jon Lauck, supra note 19. 
23 US v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 888 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (discussing the 1920 
litigation). 
24 Id. at 890. 
25 The lack of appeasement was odd because the consent decree virtually made the 
Attorney General the head of all meatpacking.  Supra, note 21 at 69‐70. 
26 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-Packing 
Industry (1919). 
27 Compare Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 591 F.3d 355, 360-62 (5
th Cir. 2009) 
(arguing statements from members of Congress and then-Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
C. Wallace demonstrate “the legislative debate surrounding the PSA supports the 
conclusion that it was designed to combat restraints of trade.”) with id. at 378-79 (Garza, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the PSA’s legislative history does not support requiring 
plaintiffs to show an adverse impact on competition because history reveals the PSA also 
aimed at protecting individual producers from “unfair” and “unjustly discriminatory 
practices”).   7 
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts.  Nor does anyone seriously 
contest that it is fair to deduce that Congress felt the previous antitrust legislation 
was “not broad enough to meet the public needs as to business practices of 
packers.”
28  How much broader Congress meant the PSA to act is unknown.  
However, support can be pulled from the history that shows both a focus 
preventing unreasonably high meat prices to consumers and prevention of 
unreasonably low prices to livestock producers.
29  These two goals provide quite 
different justifications for the purpose of the law.  Which one is correct makes a 
small difference on how the new regulations should be understood. 
Since there is no definitive answer to the question, we should next turn our 
attention to how courts have implemented both the PSA and other antitrust laws.  
After all, while separate from other antitrust laws, courts recognized that previous 
cases implementing those laws could be instructive.
30 
Questioning the Reach of the PSA 
  Included in the FTC Act is language similar to section 202 of the PSA.
31  
The FTC Act similarly offers no direction on what acts should be considered 
ʻunfair.ʼ  In allowing the FTC to proscribe “unfair methods of competition” 
Congress provided the power to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive 
                                                        
28 Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7
th Cir. 1961); See Donald Campbell, The 
Packers and Stockyard Act Regulatory Program, in Agricultural Law 186-87 (John E. 
Davison ed., 1981). 
29 Pilgrims Pride, 591 F.3d at 378-89 (Garza, J., dissenting) (highlighting the confusing 
history of the PSA). 
30 Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 268 F.2d 891, 895 (7
th Cir. 1961). 
31 Section 5 of the FTC Act current states that: “Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, 
are hereby declared unlawful.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2010).   8 
practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of 
the antitrust laws.”
32  Part of the purpose of the FTCʼs existence and discretion in 
enforcing such vague language is that “[t]he point where a method of competition 
becomes ʻunfairʼ within the meaning of the Act will often turn on the exigencies of 
a particular situation, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the 
business in question.”
33  Due to the PSA being modeled on the FTC Actʼs 
language, we will turn to the FTC Act to help understand the new regulations. 
  Earlier we stated that the history of the PSA provides inconsistent 
indicators about whether it was meant to protect consumers or farmers.  In using 
the FTC Act to help understand the PSA, we should be aware that the FTC Actʼs 
Section 5 pertains to consumers while the PSA possibly focuses on business-to-
business transactions.  However, in determining the statuteʼs reach such a 
difference should not matter.  For decades, legislatures and courts have enforced 
laws designed to protect smaller businesses when a significant disparity in 
negotiating power exists.  One of the best examples may be franchisee 
protection laws.
34  Moreover, some courts have held that as remedial legislation, 
the PSA should be “construed liberally in accord with its purpose to prevent 
economic harm to [both] producers and consumers at the expense of the 
middleman.”
35  In fact, some acts, while normally supported by national policy 
                                                        
32 Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). 
33 FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953). 
34 Michael Stumo & Douglas O’Brien, Antitrust Unfairness vs. Equitable Unfairness in 
Framer/Meat Packer Relations, 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 91, 108-10 (2003). 
35 Swift & Co. v. US, 393 F.2d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 1968).   9 
because it would be helpful to consumers, are deemed harmful to the public 
interest and illegal under section 202 because it may harm small businesses.
36 
Since the PSA potentially reaches conduct harmful to both consumers and 
small businesses, it likely reaches farther than any previous antitrust legislation.
37  
For example, a companyʼs normal refusal to deal is immune from Sherman Act 
liability absent additional factors.
38  No such immunity exists in the PSA, and a 
company subject to the PSA can suffer liability for refusing to bid against a 
competitor in purchasing livestock.
39 
  Courts largely support the far reach of the PSA.  As the Seventh Circuit 
stated in Wilson & Co. v. Benson: 
  The legislative history shows Congress understood the 
sections of the [PSA] under consideration were broader in scope 
then the antecedent legislation (61 Cong. Rec. 1805 (1921)).  To 
illustrate, Representative (later Speaker) Rayburn, emphasized that 
although Congress gave the Federal Trade Commission wide 
powers to prohibit unfair methods of competition, such authority is 
not as wide-ranging as that given to the Secretary of Agriculture 
under the language in section 202(a) and (b) of the [PSA].
40 
 
However, courts have placed limits on the reach of antitrust.  The Sherman Act 
could render every contract in commerce illegal.  Such a construction would be 
                                                        
36 Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1961) (finding that allowing a 
company’s salesmen to sell meat to hotels clients at special discounts in order to win 
business is a violation of section 202 despite probably not being a violation of other 
antitrust laws). 
37 Swift v. US, 393 F.2d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 1968) (stating that the prohibitions of Section 
202 of the PSA “are broader and more far reaching than the Sherman Act or even Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”). 
38 US v. Colgate & Co., 250 US 300 (1919). 
39 Swift v. US, 393 F.2d 247, 253 (7
th Cir. 1968). 
40 286 F.2d 891 (7
th Cir. 1961).   10 
absurd.
 41  The PSA suffers from a similarly broad reach.
42  The PSA condemns 
“any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device.”
43  It also 
condemns “sell[ing] or otherwise transfer[ing] . . . any article for the purpose or 
with the effect of apportioning the supply between persons, if such apportionment 
has the tendency or effect of restraining commerce or of creating a monopoly.”
44  
The first restrictionʼs lack of the secondʼs qualification about only acts that 
restrain commerce or create a monopoly indicate that the condition does not 
apply to the first.  Without such a limitation, it is clear that the section (a) is 
intended to reach conduct not condemned by section (c). 
  As described above, many courts have interpreted the PSA act broadly.  
The Secretary of Agriculture and private parties have used the PSA to reach 
conduct not normally condemned by the previous antitrust laws.  However, such 
broad extension began receiving judicial pushback in recent history.  This 
pushback is a major reason for the newfound need for regulations pursuant to the 
act.
45 
Judicial Pushback on the PSA 
                                                        
41 The Sherman Act declares every contract in restraint of trade illegal.  15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2010).  However, even a normal contract for sale restrains trade by not allowing the item 
to be sold to someone else.  To counter this absurd result, courts imputed a 
reasonableness requirement into the statute.  Now, only unreasonable restraints of trade 
are deemed illegal. 
42 Jon Lauck, supra note 20 at 490 (describing the broad reach of the PSA). 
43 7 USC § 192(a) (2010). 
44 7 USC § 192(c) (2010). 
45 Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 35338, 35341 
(proposed June 22, 2010) (describing how several courts of appeals have interpreted the 
statute contrary to the USDA’s interpretation).   11 
  The PSAʼs historically long reach began receiving pushback from the 
judiciary about the time private rights of action were created for violations.  
Initially, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits heard several cases and found, 
or refused to find, violations of sections 202(a) and (b) depending upon whether 
the plaintiffs demonstrated an adverse impact on competition.
46  Using this 
precedent, the Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits recently began 
requiring a similar, narrow interpretation about the reach of the PSA.
47  The Sixth 
circuit perhaps aptly declared that the “prevailing tide of other circuit court 
decisions” has turned into a “tidal wave.”
48 
  Taking a closer look at the actions brought before these courts, they are 
correct that anticompetitive conduct did not occur.  For example, in Terry v. 
Tyson Farms, Terry was a chicken grower who sued Tyson Farms, a large 
chicken processor, for allegedly ending his contract after he tried to organize 
                                                        
46 IBP, Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding no violation because 
the agreement did not “potentially suppress or reduce competition sufficiently to be 
proscribed by the Act”); Farrow v. USDA, 760 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding a 
violation because the agreement not to compete was “likely to reduce competition and 
prices paid to farmers for cattle”); De John Packaging Co. v. USDA, 618 F.2d 1329, 
1336-37 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding actions violated the PSA because they were likely to 
have an adverse impact on competition); Armour & Co. v. US, 402 F.2d 712, 722 (7th 
Cir. 1968) (finding a violation of S 202 requires an adverse impact on competition). 
47 Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007); London v. Fieldale 
Farms Corp., 410 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 
420 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005); Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co., No. 96-2542, 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24630, at *11 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1998); Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 
604 F.3d 272, 277-79 (6th Cir. 2010). 
48 Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 277 (6th Cir. 2010).  Although Terry issued 
after the regulations were proposed, it follows in the spirit and logic of the other courts of 
appeals opinions in its holding.  As such, it is demonstrative for our purposes.   12 
other chicken farmers.
49  Terry accused Tyson of refusing to allow him to verify 
the weight of his shipped chickens and then underpaid him.  When he tried to 
organize other chicken farmers, Tyson terminated his contract, supposedly to 
silence him.  Such unilateral conduct is not a violation of the antitrust laws.
50 
Upset by this change in precedent, the USDA quickly moved to stem the 
tide.  On June 22, 2010, the agency proposed new regulations stating that 
evidence of an anticompetitive effect is not necessary.  These regulations 
unabashedly and, in fact, quite directly attempt to overturn the narrow rulings 
from the court of appeals.
51  The new regulations state that an “unfair” practice 
under the PSA “can be proven without proof of predatory intent, competitive 
injury, or likelihood of injury.”
52 
The Proposed Regulations 
  Fifty years ago, Derek Bok warned about “succumbing to the economists 
who bid us enter the jungle of ʻall relevant factors,ʼ telling us very little about the 
flora and fauna that abound in its depths, but promising rather vaguely that they 
will do their best to lead us to our destination.”
53  The indeterminacy of economic 
theory can often be its undoing in attempts to provide assistance in antitrust 
                                                        
49 Terry, 604 F.3d at 274-75. 
50 Section 1 of the Sherman Act only reaches agreements.  However, the proposed 
regulations touch on specifically this type of conduct.  75 Fed. Reg.at 35351 (proposing 
than a retaliatory action in response to a farmer exercising first amendment rights is a 
violation of Section 202).  See infra for a discussion on this proposed regulation. 
51 75 Fed. Reg.at 35341 (describing how several courts of appeals have interpreted the 
statute contrary to the USDA’s interpretation). 
52 75 Fed. Reg. at 35340. 
53 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
Harv. L. Rev. 226, 227 (1960).   13 
problems.  In fact, the injection of economics into antitrust often causes courts to 
take its fundamental assumptions “on faith.”
54  By restricting violation of Section 
202 to only conduct that restrains trade, courts are injecting an economic inquiry 
into the statute.  The problem is, Section 202(a) and (b) are unclear about 
whether economics should be a limiting factor.
55  
  Under the PSA, the Secretary of Agriculture is allowed to promulgate 
regulations that help define and enforce the statute.  However, the Secretaryʼs 
regulating power has limits, otherwise courts would not have been empowered to 
set aside his orders.
56  When determining whether the reach of these regulations 
is too far, we should remember the reasons for their existence.  As discussed 
above, several court opinions contrary to the secretaryʼs interpretation have been 
issued.  Part of the reason for the regulations being written as they are is to 
nullify the effect of those opinions.
57  But there is another reason that should be 
kept in mind: the Secretary was required by Congress to propose some 
regulations.
58  
                                                        
54 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992); see Robert 
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1065 (1979) 
(describing the incorporation of economics into antitrust as requiring “large doses of 
hunch, faith, and intuition.”). 
55 Recall the discussion about terms not present in these subsections that are present in 
other parts of the statute. 
56 7 U.S.C. § 194(e) (2010). 
57 75 Fed. Reg. at 35341 (indicating that the new regulations qualify as a material change 
and warrant judicial reexamination on the reach of the PSA). 
58 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 11006 (requiring the 
secretary to “[a]s soon as practicable, not not later than 2 years after” the enactment of 
the law, the “Secretary of Agriculture shall promulgate regulations” regarding the PSA).  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In the 2008 Farm Bill, Congress included language requiring the Secretary 
to propose regulations for the PSA.
59  Congress did not specify what the 
regulations must say but the Secretary was required to “establish criteria that . . . 
will [be] consider[ed] in determining” four situations: whether an undue or 
unreasonable reference occurred in violation of the PSA; whether a live poultry 
dealer provided reasonable notice to a poultry grower of any suspension of 
delivery; when a requirement of additional capital investments by a poultry dealer 
of a poultry grower is a violation of the act; and if a poultry and swine dealer 
allowed sufficient time for a grower to remedy a breach of contract before being 
terminated.
60  This helps explain why several of the provisions in the regulations 
exist. 
  As expressed repeatedly, the PSA shares many origins and purposes with 
the FTC Act.  It seems fair then to borrow a standard from that act in determining 
whether the new regulations promulgated by the USDA comply with the PSA.  
Several decades ago, the FTC adopted the “Cigarette Rule” to analyze business 
practices.  The rule examines: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been 
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise – whether, in 
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) 
                                                        
59 Id. 
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 15 
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or 
other businessmen).
61 
 
Courts have supported this standard in its application for Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.
62   
The proposed regulations contain many significant changes.  Examining 
them all if beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, I will examine several specific 
sections of the proposed regulations.  In examining the sections, I attempt to 
apply the cigarette rule and examine whether similar requirements have been 
applied in other laws. 
Competitive Injury 
  The proposed regulations attempt to define competitive injury as: 
occurring “when conduct distorts competition in the market channel or 
marketplace.”
63  This definition not only attempts to reverse the finding of the 
several courts of appeals but defines competitive injury far broader than normally 
found in antitrust.  However, what precisely this definition means is unclear.
64  
The term has not been accurately defined in antitrust context or in the statute.  
Thus, for our purposes, we will instead examine the other definitions in the 
regulations that do declare specific acts or definitions illegal. 
                                                        
61 Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive 
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 29 
Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964). 
62 Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1985); See FTC v. Sperry 
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972) (approving this standard);  
63 75 Fed. Reg. at 35351. 
64 Running a search in LexisNexis’s all federal courts database for “distorts competition” 
produces only twenty-four results, none of which explain the term.  Search last run May 
6, 2011.  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  Before proceeding, I will reinforce one point.  Whatever section 202(a) 
means, it should not require competitive injury.  Section 202(e) of the PSA makes 
unlawful “any course of business or [ ] any act for the purpose or with the effect of 
. . . restraining commerce.”
65  If section 202(a)ʼs use of “unfair” is read to include 
a restraint on commerce, then it is unclear what actions (a) was meant to reach 
that are not condemned by (e).  Section (a) becomes superfluous.  Since, 
Congress is presumed to have meant what it said and to have meant all of what 
is said, including a ʻcompetitive injuryʼ requirement in section (a) seems 
improper.
66 
Likelihood of Competitive Injury 
  The proposed regulations contain a sweeping, new definition of ʻlikelihood 
of competitive injury.ʼ
67  In defining what constitutes a ʻlikelihood of competitive 
injury,ʼ the regulations include several situations that are illustrative but not 
limiting on what can be condemned.  The situations include where: a packer 
raises rivalsʼ costs; uses exclusive dealing to improperly foreclose competition on 
a large share of the market; and wrongfully depressing prices paid to a grower 
below market value or impairing a grower to receive “the reasonable expected full 
economic value from a transaction.”
68  Like the Sherman Act, these terms, taken 
for their linguistic value, reach ridiculous ends.  After all, it is the purpose of 
negotiations to attempt to obtain the best value and occasionally to achieve some 
                                                        
65 15 U.S.C. § 192(e) (2010). 
66 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
67 75 Fed. Reg. at 35351. 
68 Id.  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of that value by taking it from the person across the table.  This would seem to 
possibly forbid anything but a win-win negotiation.  Moreover, the regulation does 
not define how the “full economic value” is determined.
69 
The regulationʼs language seems to forbid a packer from depressing 
prices.  But not all purchasing at a lower price can be actionable otherwise the 
regulation produces absurd results.  Courts are loath to condemn conduct that is 
“the very essence of competition.”
70  The question then becomes at what point 
does purchasing at lower prices become a violation. 
Under other antitrust laws, a buyer is not typically required to inform the 
seller that it underbid its competitors.
71  Most antitrust laws also do not deal with 
a situation where the buyer may be in violation due to paying too little.
72  The only 
law that contains a provision dealing with a violation for paying too little is the 
Robinson-Patman Act.
73  In A&P, the Supreme Court examined the portion of the 
Robinson-Patman Act which deals with buyers “[k]knowingly inducing or 
receiving a discriminatory price.”
74  The case dealt with A&P, a grocery chain, 
which conducted tough negotiations with one of its distributors for dairy 
                                                        
69 Is it the economic value perceived by the seller?  The buyer?  Some independent, 
objective party? 
70 Weyerhaeuser Co v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007). 
71 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 (1979). 
72 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007), 
dealt with a monopsony where the buyer alleged overpaid in order to drive out 
competition.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
dealt with a buyer underselling their product in order to drive out competition.  Both 
cases established high bars for such allegations to constitute a violation of the Sherman 
Act. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2010) (making it illegal to induce a violation of the act by a seller). 
74 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. at 71; 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2010).   18 
products.
75  Without lying, A&P was able to possibly mislead its main supplier 
into offering a bid substantially lower than its competitors.
76  The Supreme Court 
held that such conduct did not constitute a violation of the act.
77  The Court 
reasoned that since a buyerʼs liability under the Act derived from the supplierʼs 
liability, no violation could exist unless the supplier was similarly liable.
78  In A&P, 
since the buyer had provided vague and merely possibly misleading information, 
the supplier had an affirmative defense that it reasonably believed it was merely 
matching the market.
79  Without the seller conducting a sanctionable act, the 
buyer could not be punished.  From this we learn that if a buyer is immune from 
all conduct except possibly lying to the supplier, then it is extremely rare that a 
buyer will be held liable for accepting, or inducing, a lower bid from a supplier. 
Due to the narrow reading of the Robinson-Patman Act for liability of 
buyers, the proposed regulations likely deserve a similarly narrow reading in 
terms of the “expected full economic value.”  Normal bargaining should not 
constitute a violation, even when the results lead to pricing below the sellerʼs 
expected value.  Instead, liability should be limited to situations where the buyer 
lies to the seller, an act that could be reprehensible under fraud already. 
Justifying Price Discrepancies 
One of the evils Congress created section 202(a) to solve included 
eliminating sales below cost where the packer intended to eliminate competitors 
                                                        
75 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. at 72. 
76 Id. at 71, 81 n. 15. 
77 Id. at 83-84. 
78 Id. at 76-77. 
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or injure competition through geographic price discrimination.
80  As told by the 
Secretary of the American National Livestock Association who testified in one of 
the hearings leading to the PSA:  
"In earlier periods the packers did use every available method to 
drive the small independents out of business. They would, so I am 
credibly informed, undersell them in localities until they entailed 
upon these independents so severe losses that they either had to 
go out or be absorbed. Of course, a big institution like one of the 
five packers could well afford to do this and absorb the losses that 
might be caused by this underselling in other branches and make it 
up later on after they had eliminated that competition."
81 
 
The proposed regulations declare that the PSAʼs prohibition of “unfair, 
unjustly discriminatory and deceptive practice[s] or device[s]” includes paying a 
premium or discount to a producer “without documenting the reason(s) and 
substantiating the revenue and cost justification associated with the premium or 
discount.”
82  Thus, a packer is not required to pay every grower an equal 
amount,
83 but is required to maintain documents that justify variances in the 
prices paid to growers for future investigations.  Such document requirements are 
not unprecedented for regulated industries.
84 
                                                        
80 See Hearings on Meat Packer Legislation before the House Committee on Agriculture, 
66th Cong., 2d Sess. 2211, 2657 (1920). 
81 Id.; see also Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-Packing Industry, 
Part IV 235-36 (1919). 
82 75 Fed. Reg. at 35351. 
83 Farm Bill Regulations – Misconceptions and Explanation, available at 
archive.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/rulefacts.pdf (last viewed on May 4, 2011). 
84 The FDA requires recordkeeping of companies involved in the storage and sale of food 
for national security purposes.  See Bioterrorism Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71561 (Dec. 
9, 2004).   20 
Facts giving rise to a violation of the Robinson-Patman Price 
Discrimination Act
85 have been held to also violate the PSA.
86  In Wilson & Co. v. 
Benson, Wilson had recently dismissed its manager for the San Francisco 
market.
87  In the following weeks, Wilson also lost 75% of its business to the 
former managerʼs new company, a non-compete clause was not in his contract.  
To regain the business, Wilson instructed its sales personnel to offer discounts 
beyond the normally authorized range.
88  The administrative judge of the 
Department of Agriculture found that Wilson cut prices so significantly that it lost 
over $152,000.  However, the price-cutting worked and Wilson regained a 
significant portion of its business.
89  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Department 
of Agricultureʼs finding that Wilson violated section 202(a) of the PSA because 
the statute also covers conduct that would violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
90  
Notably, Wilson did not appeal the administrative judgeʼs requirement to maintain 
records on sales similar to those proposed in the regulation.
91  While seemingly 
far reaching, one of the clear purposes of the PSA is to help prevent unjustified 
price discrimination. 
                                                        
85 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21(a) (2010) 
(original version at ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)). 
86 Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1961) (finding that “[t]he 
language in section 202(a) includes practices which might be a violation of section 2(a) 
of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act”). 
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The requirement to maintain documents does not require identical pricing 
among growers.  As such, while the added cost of keep such files may be 
significant for large packers, it seems like a reasonable requirement to advance 
the interest of both the PSA and other antitrust laws. 
Forcefully Providing Information 
  The proposed rules not only require restraint from particular action 
against growers but also require some affirmative actions.  Among those is 
the duty to provide “upon request, the statistical information and data used 
to determine compensation paid to the contract grower . . . under a 
production contract, including, but not limited to, feed conversion rates, 
feed analysis, origination and breeder history.”
92  A production contract is 
a contract that “details specific . . . responsibilities for production inputs 
and practices, as well as a mechanism for determining payment.”
93  This 
definition is in tension with the PSAʼs statutory definition of “swine 
production contract.”
94  For our purposes, which definition is correct does 
not matter.  The most important issue is the required disclosure of 
information to a counterparty during negotiations. 
                                                        
92 75 Fed. Reg. at 35351. 
93 75 Fed. Reg. at 35350-51. 
94 The PSA defines “swine production contract” as “any growout contract or other 
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swine in accordance with the instructions of another person.” 7 U.S.C. § 182(a)(13) 
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  Forcing disclosure of information is not common but also is not 
rare.
95  In heavily regulated industries, the Supreme Court has implicitly 
upheld such disclosures.
96  In fact, in the food context, the government 
requires certain disclosures to the public all the time.
97 
That the USDA would require certain pricing disclosures here is not 
wholly outside the normal so long as it furthers a significant interest.  
Interestingly, at least one state has tried to implement a pricing disclosure 
similar to the one required in this regulation.
98  Addressing that statute the 
district court held that the availability of pricing information is in the 
national interest by increasing competition: 
It is in the national interest to encourage and protect family farms 
and ranches and to enhance and promote the stability and well 
being of rural America.  More competitive markets would result in 
higher prices to producers.  Equal access to accurate pricing and 
purchase information would improve the competitiveness of the 
livestock market.  Poor or no information can lead to unnecessary 
price volatility and tardy or inaccurate adjustments to changing 
supply and demand conditions.  Inadequate or uneven information 
can cause producers to be disadvantaged, relative to packers.  
Disclosure of prices fosters competition and results in an efficient 
functioning of the market.  Disclosure significantly reduces distrust 
and a certain amount of hostility which now exists between 
producers and packers.  Information concerning prices paid by 
                                                        
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1679(c) (2010) (requiring mandatory disclosures for credit reporting 
agencies); see also 12 C.F.R. 226 (outlining the mandatory disclosures form the Truth in 
Lending Act). 
96 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (holding 
that the government can forced parties to disclose information and settle on a price 
directly instead of requiring the information be disclosed to the government, the 
government settling on a price to convey the information, and the government paying a 
portion of the settlement to the other party). 
97 See generally PETER BARTON HUTT, et. Al. FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 92-152 (3d Ed. 2007) (discussing food labeling requirements). 
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packers for livestock enables producers to be more competitive, to 
make management changes, including risk management decisions, 
and to better determine what type livestock can be produced most 
profitably.
99 
 
While the law was declared unconstitutional under the principle of the 
dormant commerce clause,
100 the USDA is not constrained by such 
considerations. 
  The required disclosure runs into a problem in that all of the 
previously mentioned disclosures, with the exception of some FDA 
disclosures, are required by statute, not regulation.  Even the Truth in 
Lending Act disclosures draw most of their language from the authorizing 
Congressional action.
101  In the proposed disclosures to growers, the 
USDA may be stretching beyond its authorization and interpretation of the 
term “unfair” in requiring these disclosures. 
Freedom from Retaliation & Coercion 
  The proposed regulations seek to limit a packerʼs contractual 
freedom by placing limits on how a packer can terminate a grower.
102  One 
such limitation is by prohibiting “retaliatory action or omission . . . in 
response to the lawful expression, spoke or written, association, or action 
of a [grower].”
103  The regulation goes on to define a retaliatory action to 
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include but not be limited to “coercion, intimidation, or disadvantage to any 
[grower] in an execution, termination, extension or renewal of a contract 
involving livestock or poultry.”
104  While the historic freedom to contract is 
still quite broad, certain restrictions do exist. 
Congress has created a cause of action in a specific instance 
where one party cancels a contract in an attempt to coerce the other.
105  
An automobile franchisee possesses a cause of action when the 
automobile manufacturer does not act in good faith in performing or 
terminating the franchisee.
106  The term “good faith” applies throughout the 
entire term of the contract and is defined “so as to guarantee the one party 
freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or 
intimidation.”
107  Exactly what conduct constitutes coercion and 
intimidation must be judged on the specific facts of the case.  Moreover, if 
no actual injury occurred, the alleged coercion must be the type of conduct 
that a reasonable man would consider a threat.
108  Once these 
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requirements are satisfied, a dealer can pursue a cause of action against 
a manufacturer for unjustly terminating his contract. 
  Similarly, the Third Circuit has upheld a preliminary injunction 
barring an antitrust defendant from cutting service to its plaintiff-
customer.
109  In Bergen, the plaintiff was a customer of the defendant and 
also brought an antitrust action against the defendant.
110  Promptly after 
learning of the antitrust lawsuit, the defendant notified the plaintiff that it 
was ceasing business relations.
111  The plaintiff filed and received a 
preliminary injunction ordering the continuing sale of items to the 
plaintiff.
112  The courtʼs primary purpose in granting the injunction was 
because it frustrated the initial antitrust litigation.
113 
On its face, the proposed regulations do not prohibit retaliatory 
actions meant to stop antitrust violations.  However, that may have been 
the underlying reason for the regulation.  In Terry, discussed above, Terry 
attempted to organize growers against Tyson Farms because of Tysonʼs 
alleged under weighing of his chickens.  The key difference between Terry 
and Bergen is that Terry did not file an antitrust complaint.  This difference 
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is significant because normally the Court recognizes a broad power for a 
business to choose to its customers.
114 
While Congress has created a cause of action for car dealer 
franchisees, it did so explicitly in a statute.  In the proposed regulations, 
the USDA is attempting to create a cause of action merely through 
regulations.  The creation of such a requirement has occurred in antitrust 
laws, as seen in Bergen, but it was limited to a case where the retaliatory 
action was intended to frustrate existing antitrust laws.  Here, the 
regulations stretch far beyond retaliatory action that frustrates the antitrust 
laws, it reaches conduct that is purely speech.  Such an extension of the 
antitrust laws, without explicit Congressional approval, is likely a step too 
far for the regulations. 
Nullifying Refusal to Deal 
  The proposed regulations also curtail a packerʼs freedom to 
contract by limiting how a grower, believed to be in breach of the contract, 
can be terminated.  The regulations include within the definition of “unfair, 
unjustly discriminatory and deceptive” the termination of a grower “with no 
basis other than the alleged by the packer . . . that the [grower] failed to 
comply with an applicable law, rule or regulation.”
115  If the packer believes 
the grower is in violation, the packer “must immediately report the alleged 
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violation to the relevant law enforcement authorities if they will to use this 
alleged violation as grounds for termination.”
116  This prohibition for 
canceling a contract appears unprecedented in antitrust and consumer 
protection laws.  Even the Automotive Dealer Franchise Act does not 
extend this far.
117  Normally the antitrust laws protect a companyʼs refusal 
to deal with a customer.  The Robinson-Patman Act explicitly supports 
such freedom from restraint.  In fact, it provides that “nothing herein 
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or 
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide 
transactions and not in restraint in trade . . . .”
118  After all, “even a firm 
with significant market power has no duty to deal with certain suppliers or 
distributors, unless it can be shown that its decisions are part of a broader 
effort to maintain its monopoly power,” an action that would possibly be 
independently actionable.
119 
Ever since before the PSA, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the Sherman Act does not prohibit a companyʼs unilateral decision to 
terminate a customer is not actionable in the vast majority of cases.
120  
More recently, in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., the Court refused to find 
the termination of a supplier per se illegal, even where there was no 
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alleged efficiency justification for the termination.
121  The only times the 
Court has condemned monopolists for refusing to deal occurred in cases 
of a monopolist terminating an existing relationship,
122 but such a 
requirement is rarely enforced on non-monopolists.  Even the cases 
against monopolists for terminating a business relationship have received 
skepticism from the Court, with one of them recently being called “at or 
near the outer boundary of [section 2] liability.”
123 
Courts have consistently refrained from enforcing a duty to deal on 
companies and this regulation should not be exempt from such 
considerations.  By its text, the regulation applies to terminations “with no 
basis other than the allegation” or violating a law, rule, or regulation.
124  
Following a strict reading, it is possible to interpret it as only applying to 
situations where a violation is the only justification.  A packerʼs desire to 
cancel the contract, or even materially breach it, would fall outside the 
regulationʼs text because then there would be a basis other than an 
alleged violation: the packerʼs desire to cancel. 
If such a narrow reading is rejected, the regulation could still be 
quite toothless.  The test requires a packer to “immediately report the 
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alleged violation to the relevant law enforcement authorities.”
125  No 
requirement that the allegation be confirmed or that the packer even wait 
for the conclusion of an investigation.  After all, the packer has no 
guarantee that the relevant authority will pursue the report and conduct an 
investigation.  If all the packer must do is send a letter, then a packer can 
easily satisfy the regulation.
126  These narrow readings suggest that this 
regulation, despite having a far-reaching tone, could be harmless. 
Conclusion 
  The proposed regulations should be interpreted to provide less 
expansive coverage than an initial first gloss suggests.  In the PSA 
context, private plaintiffs can bring suit for violation of these regulations.
127  
A material breach of contract should be a suit between the packer and 
grower, the USDA should not get involved and make it also a violation of 
regulatory law.
128 
Moreover, even if only the USDA brought actions under the 
proposed rules, they are nearly limitless.  By defining “likelihood of 
competitive injury” to include situations where a packer “wrongfully 
depresses prices paid to a producer” or “impairs a producerʼs . . . ability to 
. . . receive the reasonable expected full economic value from a 
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transaction . . . .”
129  During a negotiation, what action does not impair the 
opposing sideʼs ability to receive its full expected value?  It is in the best 
interest of the buyer to pay less for each good and it is in the best interest 
of the seller to receive more.  Rarely will each sideʼs expected values 
perfectly line up.  So which value becomes the reasonably expected full 
economic value?  The buyerʼs or the sellerʼs?  Perhaps some undefined 
third value is created?  Without such guidance, packers will possibly be 
subject to suit every time a grower feels slighted by a negotiation. 
  Moreover, the proposed regulations make at least one significant 
error: they do not explicitly state that precompetitive justifications for price 
discrepancies will be taken into consideration when a future investigation occurs.  
The USDA does state that it “would consider . . . whether there is a legitimate 
justification” for a pricing disparity, but that statement is in the explanation of the 
proposed regulations, not in the regulations themselves.
130  Looking at the FTC 
Actʼs Section 5, Congress explicitly requires that an act or practice cannot be 
considered “unfair” unless the FTC “is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”
131  It is 
unlikely that Congress would approve of any actions without considering the 
precompetitive effects.  As such, courts should hold that any alleged violation of 
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these regulations include an analysis into the possible precompetitive effects of 
the alleged conduct. 
  The proposed rules were meant to counteract the ʻtidal waveʼ of 
courts narrowing section 202(a) and (b).  However, these proposed rules 
wouldnʼt just stop the water, itʼd send the tide back in the opposite 
direction.  While some of the regulations can be quite ineffective if 
interpreted narrowly, others impose overly broad requirements.  The 
USDA should reexamine the proposed regulations and look toward the 
FTC in figuring out what types of analysis are appropriate in condemning 
ʻunfairʼ conduct. 